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IS THERE A FUTURE FOR LENIENCY IN THE 
U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 
Nora V. Demleitner* 
HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE. By lames Q. Whitman. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Pp. viii, 311. $39.95. 
The spring 2004 release of the grusome pictures of sexual 
humiliation and torture at Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad 
revealed how some U.S. troops, intelligence officers, and private 
contractors treated Iraqi prisoners taken during and after the war. 
High-ranking government officials may have condoned, if not 
encouraged, the abuses. Only reluctantly have they agreed to extend 
protections customarily accorded civilians and military fighters during 
a war to individuals detained in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 
As Congressional investigations appear to have stalled, military 
inquiries have been manifold but resultless. Only a handful of low­
ranking soldiers have been court-martialed, and a few have received 
relatively minor penalties. The public outcry has subsided, and no 
further charges or operational changes can be expected. 
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1989, Bates; J.D. 1992, 
Yale; LL.M. 1994, Georgetown. - Ed. Special thanks for their valuable insights go to Doug 
Berman, Marc Miller, and Ron Wright. I am also grateful for the assistance of Hofstra's 
reference and government documents librarian Patricia Kasting and my research assistant 
Sarah Balgley. 
1. Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, posted 
May 15, 2004, at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact; Seymour M. 
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, posted Apr. 30, 2004, at 
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact. 
The latest memorandum issued by the Department of Justice has disavowed earlier 
memoranda that appeared to condone torturous conduct and develop legal excuses and 
justifications for it. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, 
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES B. COMEY (Dec. 30, 2004), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ofc/dagmemo.pdf. However, the Bush administration continues to 
deny prisoner of war status and the protections of the Geneva Conventions to individuals 
held in Guantanamo and undisclosed locations around the world. 
Similar allegations of prisoner maltreatment and torture have been raised against British 
soldiers, some of whom have been court-martialed. In contrast to the reaction in the United 
States, the allegations appear to have triggered a broad discussion about the war in the 
British public. Severin Carrell & Raymond Whitaker, Special Report: British Abuse Trial, 
INDEPENDENT SUNDA y (London), Jan. 23, 2005, at 10. 
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At least two of the soldiers charged in the scandal had been prison 
guards in their civilian lives.2 The metrods they used at Abu Ghraib, 
which focused on humiliating the prisoners and inflicting emotional 
and physical pain, were the same as those employed in our prisons and 
immigration detention facilities at home. In late November 2004, the 
Department of Homeland Security ordered the Passaic County Jail 
and other facilities holding immigrant detainees to stop using dogs 
around them.3 The pictures of Abu Ghraib's snarling dogs burst into 
one's mind. To make matters worse, in both cases torturous tactics 
were employed against individuals not convicted of any offense. Many 
of the victims had been the targets of mandatory detention policies 
applicable to certain immigrants or of misunderstandings and baseless 
denunciations during the war. 
Policies involving torture and abuse of those unfortunate enough 
to be caught in the U.S. criminal justice rystem or its equivalent 
abroad apparently will only change upon publicity and substantial 
public pressure. The latter has been virtually absent with regard to 
detainees held outside the continental United States. Accountability 
remains low. Contrast this with the following two torture scandals that 
have rocked Germany in recent years. 
The first involved the former police vice-president of Frankfurt, 
Wolfgang Daschner. In October 2002, the Frankfurt police had 
arrested Magnus Gafgen, who was accused of kidnapping an eleven­
year-old boy. Daschner allegedly ordered that Gafgen be threatened 
with physical torture to save the child. Gafgen admitted that the boy 
was already dead, and the threatened torture never occurred. Even 
though it took a few months until investigations of Daschner started, 
he was removed from his post and has been prosecuted.4 Government 
2. Judith Greene, From Abu Ghraib to America: Examining our harsh prison culture, 4 
IDEAS FOR AN OPEN SOCIETY 1, 4, Oct. 2004, at http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_ 
publications/publications/ideas_20041004/optimizedl .pdf. 
3. See National Public Radio, Jailed Immigrants Allege Abuse: Government Halts 
Use of Dogs Around Detainees, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Nov. 30, 2004, [hereinafter NPR 
1 J, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4 l 73030. The order resulted 
apparently from a series on National Public Radio detailing the abuse of immigrants 
detained at Passaic County's jail. See National Public Radio, Jailed Immigrants Allege 
Abuse (pts. 1 & 2), ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Nov. 17 & 18, 2004, [hereinafter NPR 2] 
(describing Daniel Zwerdling's two-part investigation into prison abuse 
allegations), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4170152 and http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story .php?story Id=4 l 73701. 
4. Jilrgen Dahlkamp et al., "Machen Sie das!'', DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 15, 2004, at 42. 
Daschner was convicted but received only a warning and the threat of a fine if he 
were to commit another offense within the next twelve months. The German public 
would have preferred an acquittal. See Detlef Esslinger, Mi/des Urteil im 
Folter-Prozess, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Dec. 20, 2004, at www.sueddeutsche.de/ 
deutschland/artikel/87/45042/; Detlef Esslinger, Ha/tung bewahren, SODDEUTSCHE 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 20, 2004, at www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/84/45039/. 
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officials, including the police, condemned the actions and vowed that 
torture would remain unlawful under all circumstances. 
Even more highly publicized have been recent allegations of 
abuses and even torture within the German military. During training 
sessions, draftees and professional soldiers have been seriously 
injured, including through electroshocks, and have suffered substantial 
trauma.5 Criminal investigations have been started, and the abuses 
have reinvigorated the debate about the draft in Germany. 
As these cases indicate, the governmental responses to allegations 
of torture in the United States differ dramatically from those in 
Germany. In Germany, a public debate has surrounded the two cases, 
which have led to substantial investigations and ultimately criminal 
prosecutions. The government has frequently reasserted that, except 
in the most dire emergency, torture is impermissible and that even the 
threat of torture cannot be condoned.6 In the United States, however, 
the torture debate has quickly subsided with no substantial changes 
resulting from the events.7 Neither the abuses at Abu Ghraib nor 
continuing allegations about abuses at Guantanamo have brought 
about a heartfelt disavowal of methods of torture.8 
What may explain these differences? Are they solely a function of 
the current political powers in place, or do they rather reflect a 
dramatically different attitude toward the treatment of individuals? 
James Q. Whitman's Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the 
Widening Divide between America and Europe9 sees divergent 
punishment practices in Germany and France on the one hand and the 
5. See, e.g. , "Geiselhaft"-Affiire - Bundeswehr-Obung: Schliige fiir Soldaten, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Dec. 2, 2004, at http://www.faz.net/s/Rub28FC768942F34 
C5B8297CC6E16FFC8B4/Doc-EBD5D7D24C5DD41619A15CB2CC9EF7F38-ATpl-Eco 
mmon-Scontent.html; Struck berichtet uber zehn Mif3handlungsfiille, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE, Dec. 1, 2004, at http://www.faz.net/s/Rub28FC768942F34C5B8297CC6 
El 6FFC8B4/Doc-E9BBOD5856B534 7 A388780438D52BD913-A Tpl-Ecommon-Scontent. 
html. 
6. See, e.g., CDU-Politiker gegen Falter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Feb. 
27, 2003, at www.faz/net; Hans Holzhaider & Joachim Kiippner, Staatsanwiilte klagen 
Polizisten wegen Folterdrohung an, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Feb. 20, 2004, at 
www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/artikel/149/27122/print.html. Upon being charged, the 
police vice-president was immediately removed from his position; the police union agreed 
with the charge while another police organization expressed hope that the court would find 
an excusable emergency situation, especially since the accused himself had noted the threat 
in the file. Id. But see Koch iiussert Verstiindnis ftir Gewaltandrohung, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Feb. 22, 2003, at www.fax.net (governor of a German state 
states that he understands why threat was uttered). 
7. During the presidential contest leading up to the 2004 election, both candidates 
barely mentioned Abu Ghraib or discussed the use of torture. See, e.g., Frank Rich, On 
Television, Torture Takes a Holiday, N.Y. nMES, Jan. 23, 2005, § 2, at 1 .  
8 .  See, e.g., Editorial, The System Endures, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2004, at B6. 
9. Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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United States on the other as a reflection of long-standing historical 
differences.10 His outstanding comparative account is required reading 
for anyone interested in penal practices in any of these countries, 
especially the United States. It can help explain the growth of the 
penal industrial complex in the United States and its increasing 
harshness. Not surprisingly, those attitudes explain the country's 
acquiescence in, if not approval of, torturous conduct toward prisoners 
and alleged insurgents and terrorists, which has been condemned by 
some of the United States' closest allies. 
In a thoroughly researched book that draws on a wide variety of 
sources from all three countries, Whitman presents innumerable 
fascinating details about the historical development of sentencing at 
home and abroad and debunks a variety of myths in doing so. His 
excellent overall knowledge of sentencing developments on both sides 
of the Atlantic merges with his deep insights into other cultural, 
political, and legal traditions, especially in the areas of privacy and 
insult. 
Whitman asserts that traditions of status and of state authority 
help explain the development of punishment practices. Social and 
political hierarchies have led to mild punishments in Europe while a 
weak state and egalitarianism have caused more degrading and harsh 
punishment in the United States. In France and Germany, the forms 
of punishment and types of treatment reserved for high-status 
individuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been 
expanded to cover all criminal offenders. In contrast, low-status 
treatment, akin to the status of slaves, has become the norm for all 
criminals in the United States. 
In his account, Whitman takes issue with sociological analysis. He 
notes that punishment practices in the United States have proven 
Emile Durkheim, one of the nineteenth century's foremost 
sociologists, wrong. Durkheim had hypothesized that contracts would 
replace status. As a result, punishment would tum milder. 1 1  False, 
according to Whitman. Even though contracts have changed human 
relations, they have not replaced status, as Durkheim had predicted. 
Status, and especially its distribution, remains crucial, Whitman notes. 
In the United States, the tide has turned against high-status treatment; 
in Continental Europe, "[there has] been a revolution in favor of 
social honor, in favor of generalizing high status" (p. 196). Whitman 
10. Throughout the book Whitman refers to the United States as "America," 
terminology casually used here as well as in Europe. 
11 .  See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 44 (1984); Emile 
Durkheim, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, in THE RADICAL SOCIOLOGY OF DURKHEIM 
AND MAUSS 21 (Mike Gane ed., 1992). 
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ascribes this development largely to the fact that the United States has 
never treated high-status persons as criminals (p. 197). 
Part I of this Review will provide an overview of Whitman's book, 
his underlying assumptions, and analysis. Part II analyzes one of the 
most important and thought-provoking questions arising from 
Whitman's work: How do the current approaches to punishment fit 
with notions of democracy? Part III critiques Whitman's work for 
failing to explain sufficiently the reasons for the harshness disparity 
that began in the 1970s and has developed between France and 
Germany on the one hand and the United States on the other. If 
history is destiny, how can one account for the largely parallel 
trajectories until the early 1970s? In the end, Whitman's account may 
have erred by attempting a single explanation for a multifaceted issue. 
Despite their initial appeal, such theories "have a poor track record."12 
Finally, Part IV will explore the meaning of select themes for the 
future of leniency and harshness on both sides of the Atlantic. 
I. JAMES Q. WHITMAN'S HARSH ]UST/CE 
Harsh Justice contrasts harshness and degradation with mercy and 
dignity. While the former are increasingly associated with criminal 
punishment in the United States, the latter characterize sentencing in 
Europe. Since Whitman lays out the major themes of his work and 
summarizes his thesis in the Introduction, for the time-pressed reader 
those fifteen pages provide a cogent analysis. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Whitman situates Harsh Justice as a unique 
way of looking at punishment in the United States by strongly 
rejecting current (and past) sociological accounts of punishment as 
insufficiently comparative. Such accounts, to Whitman, are flawed as 
they overlook the crucial role status plays - a role only comparative 
analysis can reveal. 
A. Status: Crucial but Undefined 
According to Whitman, to punish a person means to treat her as 
inferior (p. 21); to degrade her means that punishment has become 
pleasurable and status elevating (p. 23). While punishment occurs in 
all three countries Whitman discusses, only in the United States has it 
turned into permanent degradation. 
12. Gregg Easterbrook, There Goes the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 7 
(Book Review), at 10 (critiquing Jared Diamond's book, Collapse, for presenting a single­
explanation theory with regard to the comparative rise of Europe). 
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The pictures documenting the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib are emblematic of degrading treatment.13 The degradation of 
others, not unlike torture, corrupts all of society. That lesson, 
however, the United States has yet to learn; instead, it appears to 
export degradation. But degradation does not have to come solely in 
the form of individual abuse. Whitman deems the layout of American 
prisons a form of systemic degradation that denies both individualism 
and privacy (pp. 59-62, 64-65).14 While Whitman does not suggest 
changes to American punishment practices, it is obvious that systemic 
degradation, rather than its individual instances, is much more difficult 
to attack, undermine, and destroy, in part because it has become a way 
of life.15 
For Whitman, degrading punishment is closely related to 
"traditions and practices of social status" (p. 26). Paradigmatic 
examples of such punishment, which lead to a permanent denial of 
status, are deprivation of rank, especially in the military, and 
mutilation.16 Status abuse becomes more important when status 
hierarchies begin to change or collapse (p. 30), a development that 
may be emblematic of the United States. Unfortunately, this remains 
an intriguing but largely unexplored idea in Harsh Justice. 
Whitman rejects the notion that all punishment necessarily 
amounts to status abuse, as he argues that status abuse is not a feature 
of punishment in Europe today. Quite to the contrary, "reverse status 
abuse" has occurred there which accords all offenders high-status 
treatment (p. 31). 
Omitted in Whitman's analysis of "status," though, is a clear 
definition of the term - a glaring contrast given the lengths to which 
Whitman goes to define "harshness."17 Who are high-status individuals 
in the United States today? Is status measured in terms of income, 
wealth, character, or employment? German definitions of status 
13. The pictures remain available on the Internet. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Abu Ghraib 
tonure and prisoner abuse, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_prisoner_abuse (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
14. See, e.g., Kate Murphy, After Enron, a Sunless Year in a Tiny Cell, N.Y. TIMES, June 
20, 2004, § 3, at 5 (describing the prison conditions awaiting Lea Fastow, a former assistant 
treasurer of Enron and the wife of Andrew Fastow, one of the lead defendants in the case 
against Enron officials); Jamie Fellner, Human Rights Watch, Prisoner Abuse: How 
Different are U.S. Prisons? (May 14, 2004), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/14/ 
usdom8583_txt.htm. 
15. Systemic inequalities have traditionally been difficult to abolish, in part because only 
few of those benefiting from the existing system have occasion to attack it. Specific examples 
are "separate but equal" and desegregation during the 1950s and 1960s, or the abolition of 
South Africa's apartheid regime. 
16. In modem times, mutilations are frequently used to permanently mark someone as 
an outcast by reminding her and society of an otherwise hidden degradation. See, e.g. , 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Dare We Call It Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A21. 
17. See infra Part I.B. 
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appear to focus on the educational attainment and income of one's 
parents.18 
Whitman notes the absence of "a proper correspondence between 
status, wealth, and respectful treatment" (p. 30) but does not further 
elucidate the content of the term "status." Nevertheless, recent 
prosecutions of those he would presumably consider high-status 
individuals support his point: Sol Wachtler, the former chief justice of 
the New York Court of Appeals; O.J. Simpson, football star and actor; 
Webster Hubbell, Associate Attorney General during the Clinton 
administration; Martha Stewart, the undisputed queen of good 
housekeeping; Kobe Bryant, professional basketball player; and 
Michael Jackson, the world-famous reclusive pop star. America seems 
to revel at the sight of corporate executives, such as Andrew Fastow 
and Dennis Koslowski, in handcuffs. Even though their wealth 
enabled all of these individuals to procure first-rate counsel, such legal 
assistance often could neither protect them from conviction nor shield 
them from degrading treatment such as the use of handcuffs or 
intrusive booking procedures. The message is clear: even the wealthy 
and famous cannot escape punishment and degradation. 
In accordance with Durkheim's prediction, the punishment of such 
high-status offenders, if convicted, may "mobilize popular solidarity" 
(p. 44). It could help shore up an otherwise weak state and deny 
increasingly vast differences in wealth and status. As the gap between 
the super-wealthy and the average American has increased 
dramatically in the last few decades, the harsh and degrading 
treatment of the wealthy and famous upon their convictions appears 
to level the playing field and reaffirm the American dogma that all are 
treated alike. What does it mean to be treated equally - equally 
harshly? 
B. Defining Harshness 
Whitman entitles his book "Harsh Justice" (emphasis added), an 
indicator that his focus is on explaining punishment in the United 
States. In defining harshness, he focuses on harshness in 
criminalization, harshness in punishment, and available forms of 
mercy (p. 33). To bolster his hypothesis that the United States is 
uniquely harsh, Whitman harnesses a vast array of facts. Some of his 
analysis, however, appears to overstate his point. 
18. See, e.g. , Deutsch/and besser, aber "ungerechter" bei Pisa, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE, Dec. 5, 2004, at http://www.faz.net. 
1238 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1231 
1. Criminalization 
Whitman defines criminalization to encompass conduct and certain 
groups of individuals (p. 33). Conduct criminalized in the United 
States includes high-level white collar offenses, terrorism-related ' 
crimes, and some sex or morals offenses (pp. 43-45) . Since some sex 
offenses have been decriminalized,19 as described by Whitman, it 
might be more accurate to label the offenses that are being 
criminalized - marital rape, domestic violence, pornography, and 
stalking - crimes committed largely against women and children. In 
the wake of highly publicized acts of terrorism, terrorism-related 
crimes, such as money-laundering, increasingly have been 
criminalized. Criminalization in the United States implies the 
demonization of the offense and the offender. Even ma/a prohibitum 
crimes are characterized as inherently evil to justify acting against 
them. 
Europe, on the other hand, has decriminalized or even legalized an 
increasing number of morals offenses, such as prostitution and drug 
offenses. Most of us are familiar with the liberal Dutch policies 
pertaining to cannabis and the legalization of prostitution.20 
Americans, however, may be less familiar with the Swiss drug projects 
and the decriminalization of prostitution in Germany. It may be even 
harder for us to imagine a debate in the United States akin to the one 
recently held in Germany concerning the decriminalization of minor 
thefts. At the time, the Green Party, part of the ruling coalition 
government, proposed making minor thefts a mere civil violation 
rather than a criminal offense. While U.S. law recognizes civil 
sanctions for crimes, they have been in addition to, rather than as 
replacements of, criminal sanctions.21 
19. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas statute 
making same-sex sodomy a criminal offense). 
20. See, e.g. , Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A Drugs - 2003: A Guide to 
Dutch Policy, at http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=175A6D3F 
70164607A386D43B61DC135FX2X42819X14 (2003) {last visited Apr. 15, 2005); 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Policy on Prostitution: Questions and 
Answers (2004), at http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=DD4 
FBBCB6EE14102A58AAA13FEA22B43 {last visited Apr. 15, 2005). Even though the 
Netherlands has now legalized prostitution, Sweden has moved to criminalize it, for the 
client/customer only. Ministry of Industry, Employment, and Communications, Fact Sheet: 
Prostitution and Trafficking in Women (Oct. 2004), at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/ 
c6/03/16/13/110ab985.pdf {last visited Apr. 15, 2005). While this may counter the European 
trend, it fits with developments in the United States geared to the protection of women. 
Sweden, although known for its liberalism, has taken a harsher position against drug and sex 
offenses than many other European countries. See, e.g., Ingmarie Froman, Sweden Mobilizes 
Against Drugs, Jan. 16, 2004, at http://www.sweden.se/templates/cs/Article_7823.aspx {last 
visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
21. Through the plea bargaining process civil sanctions may come to replace criminal 
penalties. 
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On the other hand, many actions criminalized in the United States 
for years have just recently been defined as crimes in Europe. For 
example, Europe has followed the American example with regards to 
the criminalization of white-collar offenses, according to Whitman, but 
usually without the imposition of severe punishment. This may 
change, though, as economic crimes of greater magnitude occur in 
Europe. European women's rights groups, many with international 
connections, have also advocated the criminalization of marital rape, 
prostitution, pornography, human trafficking, and domestic violence 
that are now being increasingly prosecuted and severely punished in 
the United States. Finally, as terrorism-related offenses become 
enshrined in international treaties, their prosecution becomes 
obligatory around the world. 
It is the criminalization of classes of persons, such as minors, where 
Whitman sees a starker difference between Europe and the United 
States. While many Germans consider fourteen, the age of criminal 
liability in Germany, too high,22 almost no European would defend a 
life without parole sentence imposed on a twelve-year-old, as occurred 
in Florida.23 The special treatment of juveniles and young adults, 
however, has come under attack in Germany as well. For example, 
Germany's opposition parties have proposed that 
Sicherungsverwahrung, a form of potentially indefinite civil 
commitment for sex offenders and a few other criminals, be extended 
even to those under eighteen years of age, effectively threatening 
them with a life sentence.24 
In his definition of criminalization, Whitman also includes 
harshness in grading, where the United States has taken the lead. 
Much of this is due to increased punishment for recidivists and for 
"crimes of the day" (pp. 56-57). Sanctions for sex offenders have 
increased throughout the 1990s, and in this decade;25 crimes against 
22. For a review of data and issues pertam g to the age of criminal liability, 
see Gregor Urbas, The Age of Criminal Responsibility, TRENDS & ISSUES IN 
CRIME & CRIM. JUST., (Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, Aust!.), Nov. 2000, at 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti181 .pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
23. See, e.g. , Stephanie Simon, New Plea Deal Could Free Boy Sentenced to Life for 
Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2003, at A15. Lionel Tate was released in January 2004 
following an agreement between the prosecution and the defense that he would plead guilty 
to manslaughter. The plea agreement occurred after an appellate court threw out his murder 
conviction, which had led to an automatic life sentence. See, e.g. , Duncan Campbell, Parole 
for youth given life jail sentence, GUARDIAN, Jan. 27, 2004, at 19. 
24. Hans-JOrg Albrecht, Security Gaps Responding to Dangerous Sex Offenders in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 200, 206 (2004); Nora V. 
Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and 
Sicherungsverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621 (2003). 
25. The U.S. Sentencing Commission enhanced sentences for sex offenses multiple 
times, usually upon congressional demand. See, e.g. , U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
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women are punished ever more severely. Many of these crimes are 
characterized as inherently evil, a function of lesser state power in the 
United States and the influence of Christian revival (p. 64). On the 
other hand, Europeans have downgraded many offenses, especially 
morals crimes, to de/its or Ordnungswidrigkeiten or decriminalized 
them. This may be an overstated difference, though, as Europeans 
have also increasingly sanctioned sex offenders.26 
Inflexible doctrines of criminal liability and harshness in 
enforcement may also contribute to harshness in criminalization. 
Whitman notes no changes in doctrines of criminal liability in the 
United States or Europe. He omits the important doctrinal change 
that occurred with regard to the insanity defense, which Congress 
modified after John Hinckley attempted to assassinate President 
Reagan. Not only did Congress restrict the substantive defense, but it 
also put the burden on the defendant to show the existence of a 
mental disease or defect that made it impossible for him to appreciate 
the wrongness of his action.27 Many states followed the federal model 
so as to make it more difficult for defendants to show insanity. Also, 
the Supreme Court has sanctioned a state's decision to remove 
intoxication as a defense even for purposeful offenses.28 In Europe, on 
the other hand, "flexibility in doctrines of liability is gradually being 
replaced by flexibility in the application of punishment" (p. 84). 
Because of individualized punishment, doctrines of liability may be of 
lesser importance in determining mildness. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Whitman offers no judgment how 
enforcement, his last component of criminalization, compares between 
the United States and Europe (p. 84). While he may be right that "[i]t 
is too empirically difficult to form any firm sense of how continental 
law should be measured by this category" (p. 84), one is left 
Sentencing Federal Sexual Offenders: Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 
1998 (Feb. 14, 2000), at http://www.ussc.gov/sexpred/sexpred.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
See also Feeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) 
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
For changes to state sentencing guidelines, see, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing 
Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & JUST. 131, 163 (2005); David Boerner & 
Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & JUST. 71 (2001). In 
addition, collateral sanctions have been substantially increased on sex offenders. Among the 
best known are sex offender notification and registration provisions and civil commitment 
for sex offenders. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Hendricks v. Kansas, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997). 
26. See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 24. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2004); see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The 
Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 631-
40 (1990) (describing procedural and substantive shifts after Hinckley acquittal based on 
insanity). 
28. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
May 2005) Is There a Future for Leniency? 1241 
won<lering whether there are not some ways to measure differences in 
enforcement. Anecdotally, American enforcement appears much 
harsher, especially in light of zero-tolerance policing initiatives and the 
"War on Drugs." Empirically, it might be possible to assess law­
enforcement density as compared with population or focus on law­
enforcement expenditure. While such measures would not be 
unassailable, they would provide some insight into enforcement 
harshness. Many researchers indicate that enforcement of the laws, 
rather than the criminal justice doctrine itself, accounts for the 
harshness in America's punishment and its racial imbalance. Because 
of that reality, it seems curious that Whitman would dismiss this factor 
so cursorily and casually. 
2. Harshness of Punishment 
Whitman highlights three different forms of harshness of 
punishment: in the law, its application, and its inflexibility (p. 35). 
Penalty provisions threatening long prison terms for drug off enders 
and recidivists, including non-violent criminals, have led to an 
unprecedented growth in the prison population (pp. 56-58). 
Imprisonment itself has become noticeably harsher, often reverting to 
nineteenth-century practices, and new, particularly degrading 
penalties, such as public shaming, have been introduced.29 The latter 
was initially designed as a reintegrative practice and used in Native 
communities in Australia and Canada.30 As currently practiced in the 
United States, however, shaming has become degrading, exclusionary, 
and stigmatizing rather than reaffirming of membership in society.31 
Even though many European countries have increased sentences 
in the last few years, especially for sex off enders, they started from 
milder punishments, which means that the overall sentences are 
substantially lesser even today. In addition, neither sentencing judges 
nor legislatures have been as inventive as Americans with regard to 
the development of new sanctions. 
Most Americans get their information about prisons from movies, 
many of which display rampant violence, male-on-male rape, and the 
29. See, e.g., Note, Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming 
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186 (2003). Shaming practices are 
frequently inventions of the sentencing judge. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 
1997). 
30. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
31. See, e.g., Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880 (1991); James Q. Whitman, What ls Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). But see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). 
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dominance of racially exclusive gangs.32 As Whitman notes, prison 
conditions have generally improved during the last few decades, in 
part because of reforms instituted during the 1960s and 1970s, and also 
because many prisons have been built relatively recently due to the 
increase in prison-bound offenders. Nevertheless, the reality of 
imprisonment is not pleasant. 
Unless prodded by major negative headlines, neither the judiciary 
nor legislatures have taken the initiative on prison reforms.33 It has 
taken the events of Abu Ghraib to focus attention on prison 
conditions at home. Sexual degradation, human rights groups tell us, is 
not uncommon in U.S. prisons, with much of it conducted with the 
permission, if not active encouragement, of prison guards and 
administration.34 That two of the people accused of abuses at Abu 
Ghraib are former prison guards should trouble us,35 but should not be 
surprising as U.S. prisons report frequent abuses, often due to 
untrained guards who are unable to deal with prison inmates.36 
In contrast, European prison guards are civil servants who have to 
undergo substantial job training. Prison conditions have substantially 
improved in Europe, which may help explain the shock Europeans 
displayed about the events at Abu Ghraib. Some of the differences, 
however, may be overstated, as Whitman admits. Conditions in 
French and Italian pre-trial facilities are gruesome.37 
With the support of domestic and regional courts, Europeans 
continue to improve prison conditions. This is true even for pre-trial 
detention, the dark side of incarceration in Europe. On the other 
hand, European prisons face the same problems as those in the United 
32. See, e.g., AMERICAN HISTORY X (New Line Cinema 1998). 
33. See, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
225 (2003) (detailing reports by watchdog organizations and government agencies as well as 
judicial decisions documenting abuses in prisons); Martin A Geer, Protection of Female 
Prisoners: Dissolving Standards of Decency, 2 MARGINS 175 (2002). 
34. Congressional legislation aimed at studying rape in prison aims at one scintillating 
area of abuse. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U .S.C. §§ 15601-07 (2005). 
35. Fellner, supra note 14. 
36. For a description of the daily work of prison guards, see generally TED CONOVER, 
NEWJACK: GUARDING SING SING (2000). Abuse reports spiked after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Many of those incarcerated in the wake of those attacks have 
documented substantial abuse on the part of their jailers. Abuse has also been reported from 
private prisons and from immigration detention facilities. See, e.g. , NPR 2, supra note 3. 
Some of the individuals sent to Iraq to rebuild the prison system there have had 
disciplinary complaints and actions against them in the United States. See, e.g., Fox 
Butterfield, Mistreatment of Prisoners Is Called Routine in U.S. , N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at 
All. 
37. See, e.g., Joachim Rogge, Pfahls' Leiden in 'La Sante', SCHWABACHER TAGBLATT, 
Aug. 3, 2004, at 5; INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 2004 IHF ANNUAL REPORT 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ITALY, at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id= 
3&d_id=3860 (last visited June 23, 2004). 
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States concerning racism and the overrepresentation of ethnic and 
national minorities.38 Both may lead to the abuse of minority groups in 
prisons, especially when these groups are demonized by the larger 
society. 
In discussing the harshness of sanctions, Whitman points to the 
development of alternative punishments (p. 62). While they appear to 
introduce a touch of mildness, this is only the case when they are 
imposed instead of a prison sentence rather than replacing a less harsh 
sentence.39 Instead of imposing a term of probation, as would have 
occurred in the past, judges now may sentence an offender to a 
panoply of measures, including, for example, community service and 
drug treatment. Such "net widening" often leads the offender to end 
up in prison because he violates some additional alternative sanction.40 
Most important in the development of harsher punishment may be 
the acceptance of determinate sentencing, the proliferation of 
mandatory minimums, pp. 53-55, and, unmentioned by Whitman but 
nevertheless crucial, the criminalization of technical parole violations. 
Determinate sentencing in the federal system demonstrates 
Whitman's point. Prescribed penalty ranges have cabined judicial 
discretion. As of April 30, 2003, federal district court judges have been 
further restricted in their ability to display mildness in punishment and 
individualize sentences. In an effort to decrease downward departures, 
i.e., the imposition of a lesser sentence than otherwise prescribed by 
the federal sentencing guidelines, Congressional legislation in the form 
of the so-called Feeney Amendment has required appellate courts to 
apply a de novo review standard and directed the Commission to 
develop restrictions on downward departures. Even after the Feeney 
Amendment, nothing prevents judges from imposing a higher 
sentence than recommended. Only a few of them, however, are likely 
38. See, e.g., 21 CRIME & JUST. (1997). 
Whitman's assertion that in the United States "deportable aliens are kept in special 
camps," p. 79, is incorrect. Many of them are held in prison facilities, together with convicted 
offenders. The same holds true for asylum seekers of all ages. Inna Nazaroza, Comment, 
Alienating "Human" from "Right": U.S. and UK Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations 
Under International Human Rights Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1335, 1384 & n.250 (2002). 
The special camps in which asylum seekers in Germany are held are unpleasant but offer 
substantially more freedom than a prison. For a critique of Germany's immigration 
detention facilities, see Amnesty International, Annual Report 2001, at http://web.amnesty. 
org/web/ar2001.nsf/webeurcountries/GERMANY?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 15, 
2005). 
39. See, e.g., Wayne N. Renke, Sensible Justice: Alternatives to Prison, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 
823, 838-39 (1999) (book review). 
40. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391, 398-400 (1995). 
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to do so,41 as many judges consider mandatory minimums and 
guideline sentences too high.42 
In January 2005, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that may 
bring to a head the power struggle between Congress and the judiciary 
over sentencing.43 The Court declared the federal guidelines 
unconstitutional, excised a few provisions, and held the rest to be 
merely advisory. So far, the responses of lower courts have varied. 
While some have found the guidelines strong indicators of the 
sentences they should impose, others have resorted to the language of 
the Sentencing Reform Act, rather than specific guideline provisions, 
for guidance.44 Congress is expected to respond with legislation in the 
course of 2005. Whether the Court's declaration will lead to harsher or 
more lenient sentencing remains an open question. Congressional 
action may indicate whether at least the federal system will remain 
among the most punitive sentencing regimes in the world. 
These developments in the federal courts mirror a larger, long­
standing debate between those favoring individual treatment of 
criminal offenders and those opting for equality.45 Even though 
individualization is considered a panacea by many critics of the U.S. 
sentencing regime,46 Whitman notes that individualization does not 
unfailingly lead to mildness.47 Nevertheless, the equal treatment 
currently accorded criminal offenders, especially in the federal courts, 
has been one of unmitigated harshness which developed out of an 
alliance of liberals who advocated greater social equality (and 
mildness) and conservatives who deemed determinate sentences an 
opportunity for harsher and longer sentences. The first U.S. 
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
51 fig.G (Sept. 30, 2002) (showing that upward departures have decreased dramatically since 
the early 1990s and now make up only about 0.8 % of the cases sentenced annually), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
42. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES SUMMARY REPORT 
(Dec. 2, 2002), at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsurvey02.pdf. 
43. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
44. See generally Nora V. Demleitner et al., 2005 INTERIM SUPPLEMENT: THE 
BLAKELY/BOOKER REVOLUTION (2005), at http://www.sentbook.com. 
45. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748-51 (Stevens, J., merits majority) (highlighting jury fact­
finding); 759, 761 (Breyer, J., remedial majority) (focusing on Congressional intent to 
abolish unwarranted disparity and create uniformity) (dialogue between the Stevens 
majority opinion and the Breyer dissent). The debate goes back to the beginning of modern 
reforms of the penal system. Italy's foremost penologist, Cesare Beccaria, was among the 
first to outline a regime based on equality and devoid of unwarranted disparity (p. 50). 
46. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). 
47. P. 52. Judge Frankel's account of federal sentencing prior to the advent of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines should also serve as a caution to those who would like to reinstitute 
indeterminate sentencing. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LA w WITHOUT 
ORDER (1973). 
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Sentencing Commission and its successors frequently chose punitive 
options when an alternative was available. Historically, Congressional 
involvement has further increased the harshness of sentences, largely 
through mandatory minimum sentences.48 
While Whitman refers to state experiences in endnotes, much of 
his account is based on the federal sentencing guidelines. State 
sentencing guidelines, however, are often more flexible and less harsh 
than the federal guidelines.49 Nevertheless, even in states with 
indeterminate sentencing regimes and parole options, offenders are 
usually released after having served longer periods in prisons than in 
the past, often because of federal financial incentives50 and legislative 
enactments of mandatory minimum sentences. Additionally, in some 
states, most importantly California, even technical parole violations 
can lead to an almost immediate return to prison. For that reason, 
over one third of California's prison inmates are parole violators.51 
The same groups that have been targeted in the United States in 
the last few decades have also been subjected to harsher punishment 
in Europe: "violent offenders, terrorists, certain sex offenders, drug 
dealers" (p. 71). In the United States, however, property offenders 
remain a substantial group - almost one third - of those 
incarcerated,52 and are often subject to substantial sentence 
enhancements, such as California's three-strikes law. The most 
important difference, though, is that Europeans have mitigated their 
penal harshness through individualized sentences that can draw on a 
host of alternative sanctions. Despite some public doubts, 
resocialization remains a crucial goal of European sentencing - an 
aspiration anchored in Constitutions and international and regional 
treaties. 
3. Mildness 
Finally, Whitman contrasts elements of penal harshness with two 
forms of mildness: respectful treatment and pardons (p. 36). Respect is 
48. See, e.g., David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn from the 
Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 588-89. 
49. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina 1980-
2000, 29 CRIME & JUST. 39 (2002). 
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2005) (so-called "85% law" providing for incentive grants to 
states incarcerating violent felons for 85% of the time sentenced). 
51. See nMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN 
PAROLE SUPERVISION, 1990-2000, at 13 (2001). 
52. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON STATISTICS, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/prisons.htm (last modified Dec. 28, 2004). 
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rarely accorded criminal offenders in the United States. Prison 
uniforms and the absence of privacy are hallmarks of the degradation 
of prison inmates. s3 Because of the remote location of prisons and the 
limited information flow between the inside and the outside world, 
however, the general population knows little about the daily 
degradations that take place in the name of the people. Rarely do 
pictures or films reveal the whole reality. The pictures of Guantanamo 
detainees in orange jumpsuits and shackles have provided such an 
unusual occasion and have indelibly burned themselves in the world's 
memory. The decline of sealing records and expungements, together 
with publicly accessible databases of sex offenders and others, 
continue the degradation beyond the endpoint of a criminal justice 
sanction. They makes the full rehabilitation of ex-offenders impossible 
- their criminal records follow the offenders for the rest of their lives. 
Europe presents a diametrically opposite picture. The law of 
dignity - a blend of "entitlement in the modem social state . . .  [and] 
much older ideas of personal honor," p. 85 - has been extended to all 
members of society, including prisoners. s4 Civil death no longer exists 
in Europe as all offenders, including prison inmates, remain integrated 
in all aspects of society (pp. 85-86). This is exemplified in that all 
offenders maintain their voting rights, including those imprisoned (p. 
86). Contrast this with the U.S. practice which denies the franchise to 
all those imprisoned ---.,- unless detained in Maine or Vermont - and 
to many ex-offenders. ss Strikingly, disenfranchisement is a prevalent 
practice that has been constitutionally sanctioned, s6 a fact that makes it 
difficult to attack the practice through constitutional litigation. 
In addition, U.S. law mandates a deprivation of welfare benefits 
for certain drug offenders, which is inconceivable in Europe. s7 
Germany, as Whitman notes, guarantees inmates upon release access 
to unemployment benefits, a practice that facilitates reintegration. The 
lack of welfare benefits upon release has posed serious problems for 
released prison inmates in the United States. Many are ineligible for 
53. In so-called "super-max" prisons, degradation has been taken a step further so that 
some courts have found a special liberty interest in not being transferred to such a facility. 
See Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). 
54. P. 85. Whitman refers on more than one occasion to the fact that German prison 
guards must address prisoners in the formal "Sie." Curiously, especially among younger 
Germans it has become prevalent to address even mere acquaintances with the informal 
"Du." Id. 
55. See, e.g., JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE (1998); Nora V. 
Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000). For 
more information and updates on felon disenfranchisement, see www.sentencingproject.org 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
56. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
57. See, e.g. , Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Re-entry for Drug 
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027 (2002). 
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benefits; for others, the application process is difficult to navigate; 
some cannot wait until approval goes through. The reentry movement, 
which is designed to facilitate the return of prison inmates into society, 
has begun to address reintegration problems. The movement, 
however, is not focused on restoring, let alone retaining, the inherent 
dignity of ex-offenders but largely addresses the problem as one of 
fiscal prudence, safety, and protection from recidivism.58 Any 
assistance granted offenders must be justified on these grounds to be 
considered politically feasible. Arguments for greater leniency are 
therefore dramatically different between the two continents. 
In the United States presidential and gubernatorial pardons have 
decreased substantially in the last few decades despite a growing 
prison population.59 Amnesties for criminal offenders are virtually 
unimaginable,60 though they occur regularly in Europe. Underlying 
these distinctions in terms of mercy are different views of 
individualization and discretion. These debates merged in the criticism 
of Governor Ryan's commutation of the sentences of all death row 
inmates in Illinois. He was attacked for an abuse of discretion, 
increasingly an attack levied against all pardons in the United States.61 
The currently low number of pardons in the United States, however, 
58. See, e.g. , JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2001). For further information on the 
reentry movement, see, for example, http://www.sentencingproject.org (last visited Mar. 20, 
2005) and http://www.urbaninstitute.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
59. Margaret Colgate Love, Fear and Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and 
Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 25 (2001); Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, 
Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 139 (2001). 
· 60. Shanor & Miller, supra note 59 (indicating the rarity of amnesty, many of which 
have focused on war-related conduct). 
The debate about an amnesty for undocumented immigrants is instructive. The first such 
amnesty in 1986 was accompanied by statutory changes threatening crilninal enforcement 
against the employers of undocumented imlnigrants. Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) §§ lOl(a), 201, 302, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1255a, 1159-60 (1988) (providing for 
imposition of sanctions on employers who employ undocumented labor as well as amnesty 
and special agricultural worker programs). The current debate about an amnesty contains a 
sub-debate about rewarding "crilninals," for example, undocumented migrants, which would 
be even more pronounced in case of an amnesty for "real criminals." See, e.g., Mark 
Krikorian, Amnesty, Again - This Country Should Have Learned, Apparently It Has Not, 
NAT'L REV., Jan. 26, 2004, at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/markoped012604.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
61. See, e.g., David A. Wallace, Dead Men Walking - An Abuse of Executive Clemency 
Power in Illinois, 29 DAYTON L. REV. 279 (2004). The pardons issued by President Clinton 
during the waning days of his presidency further underlnined the process and general 
acceptance of pardons. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of 
Clinton's Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185 (2003); Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency 
Decisions be Subject to a Reasons Requirement?, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 150 (2000/2001). 
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may suggest incorrectly that pardons have always been rare. 
Historically, pardons were prevalent and usually undisputed.62 
Once Whitman has determined that the United States is 
substantially more punitive than France and Germany, the question 
arises "why"? All of these countries are liberal Western democracies, 
welfare states, at least to some extent, infused by civil rights and 
human rights norms. In Whitman's view, historical attitudes about 
status explain the differences. 
B. High-Status and Low-Status Punishments 
In contrast to many other commentators, Whitman rejects the 
claim that racism explains America's trend toward harshness. He 
views the increasing punishment of all juveniles, irrespective of race,63 
and of high-status offenders as proof that racism cannot be the sole 
cause of harshness. 
Whitman views American status egalitarianism as a leading reason 
for harshness. The highlight of the book may be the historical analysis 
Whitman presents to make his case. During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, sanctions in Europe distinguished between 
punishments inflicted on the aristocracy and political prisoners versus 
those imposed on ordinary criminals. Beginning over one hundred 
years ago, European punishments once reserved solely for the elite 
began to be extended to ordinary offenders, so that today all offenders 
are treated like high-status criminals. This means that all of them are 
accorded respect and dignity. In the United States, in contrast, all 
offenders - high- and low-status - are punished severely and 
degraded. 
Even in antiquity, punishment implied a loss of honor, a practice 
continued throughout the centuries. High-status imprisonment in 
Europe, however, had different origins. It derived from clerical 
conventions and the practice of holding high-status individuals captive 
for ransom in fortresses (pp. 105-07). These habits guaranteed high­
status prisoners special treatment when incarcerated (p. 107). 
While the mode of extending privileged treatment has differed 
slightly between France and Germany (p. 108), the result has been the 
same. Today all inmates are accorded high-status treatment which was 
once reserved to "aristocrats and the like" (p. 108). Whitman traces in 
62. See, e.g. , George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and 
Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENTENCING 
REP. 212 (2004) (describing numerous presidential pardons in the early days of the 
Republic). 
63. Even though this may be true technically, minority children are more frequently 
saddled with serious juvenile records and are more often transferred into the adult system. 
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 
24 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1998). 
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detail the changes in France and in Germany, reaching back to the 
Code Penal of 1791 and the Napoleonic Code of 1810 in France and 
the Criminal Code of 1890 in Germany. 
The Napoleonic Code established the distinction between criminal 
offenses and offenses considered less than a crime - delits and 
contraventions (p. 117) - creating a path that has led France away 
from increasing criminalization. In his fascinating historical account, 
Whitman traces the different categories of offenders who were 
accorded high-status treatment in France during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The privilege was extended from aristocrats 
to duelists, political dissenters, and debtors in the nineteenth century, 
and ultimately to all in the 1980s. Interestingly, recent prison reform in 
France "was bound up closely with the problem of political prisoners" 
(p. 129) which ultimately led to the treatment of all prisoners "as 
politicals, as rebels against the established order" (p. 133). Whether 
the threat of terrorism in Europe will lead to the development of 
another tier of imprisonment with fewer benefits or reinvigorate calls 
for the special treatment of political prisoners is open to question. 
Since today's terrorists often differ in ethnic origin, religion, and 
sometimes citizenship from the population of the country where they 
commit offenses, the former may be more likely. Germany treated 
even members of its domestic terrorist groups who committed high­
profile violent crime during the 1970s and 1980s substantially more 
harshly than most other murderers. 
In Germany high-status treatment was accorded to prisoners of 
"good character," which marked the beginning of the individualization 
of punishment (p. 132). In the nineteenth century the distinction in 
character was reflected in the types of confinements available -
dishonorable prison (Zuchthaus), regular prison (Gefiingnis), and non­
dishonoring fortress confinement (Festungshaftung), which was 
reserved for those who committed crimes of honor. 64 German law 
began to develop the doctrine of extenuating circumstances and to 
individualize punishment, largely as a consequence of the focus on the 
offender's moral character and intention. 
Even though Nazi "justice" was characterized by the harsh 
treatment of political prisoners - a previously privileged group -
and of habitual offenders, its main concepts otherwise did not vary 
much from earlier practices. After World War II, German law reacted 
against the preceding harshness but, at their core, earlier practices 
continued - the extension of "high-status, 'honorable' treatment to 
64. As Whitman points out, like many right-wing politicians of his time, Adolf Hitler 
was sentenced to Festungshaftung in 1923 following an attempted putsch. However, he failed 
to afford his political opponents similar benefits. See generally !NGO MUELLER, NAZI 
JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991). 
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all" (p. 141). So Whitman could assert that "in the world of European 
dignity, there is much more continuity with the fascist period than 
most Europeans have been ready to acknowledge" (p. 150). 
One of the great contributions of Harsh Justice is its debunking of 
the myth that the mildness in Continental punishment is solely a 
reaction to the harshness of fascism and Nazism. He sees current 
punishment practices as deeply grounded in Europe's past and the 
impact of Nazism and fascism as more ambiguous than previously 
assumed. 
Whitman asserts that "American criminal justice displays a 
resistance to considering the very personhood of offenders" (p. 9), 
which also plays out in its reluctance to consider individual 
characteristics at sentencing. According to Whitman, two hundred 
years ago, the United States discarded high-status treatment in its 
criminal justice system so as to "generalize norms of low-status 
treatment" (p. 11). 
Whitman's account traces low status in the Anglo-American world 
back to Medieval practices. By the mid-eighteenth century low-status 
penalties had declined in England, and respect for persons was less 
important than on the Continent (p. 153), possibly due to a less 
entrenched status hierarchy. With the routinization of the pardon 
process by the late eighteenth century, low-status· offenders benefited 
as much as others. England had abolished status differentiation much 
earlier than the Continent. 
This attitude was replicated in the American colonies, though 
status differentiation did not vanish entirely. Pardons, for example, 
appeared to be granted largely to high-status individuals.65 This 
became a cause for attack on executive clemency during the 
nineteenth century. Even though most of American sentencing 
practice remained discretionary throughout that century, high-status 
punishments began to decline, as deterrence principles came to 
dominate. U.S. law focused on procedural protections for those 
accused of criminal offenses rather than on the abolition of low-status 
penalties. Whitman notes that by the mid-1860s "the status of 
prisoners came . . .  to be explicitly assimilated to that of slaves" (p. 
173). This led to low-status punishment for all, and imprisonment 
became a low-status penalty, with its practices - corporal punishment 
and forced labor - largely akin to slavery. The denial of political 
rights to many criminal off enders was the logical consequence of such 
treatment. And as Whitman notes so chillingly, "nobody was troubled 
by the symbolic declaration that prisoners should have the status of 
slaves; they remained untroubled by it for a century; and it can be said 
65. But see Lardner & Love, supra note 62, at 214-16 (describing numerous judicially 
supported or initiated pardons that benefited lower class individuals). In some cases, judges 
denied their support for pardon requests to well-connected individuals. Id. at 215-26. 
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that, by the 1980s, they were untroubled by it once again" (p. 177). 
How could this be true at two hist6rically so different times? 
C. Comparative Harshness and Low-Status Punishments Explained 
The reason the U.S. criminal justice system "show[s] less respect 
for persons than the continental systems" (p. 42), according to 
Whitman, is due to America's "comparatively strong commitment to 
formal equality" (p. 42), which characterizes sentencing practices and 
doctrines of liability, ultimately leading to low-status punishments for 
all. Concepts of '"[d]ignity' and 'degradation' as such fall on deaf ears 
in American legal culture . . .  " (p. 190), however. This contrasts 
sharply with the European attempt to "generaliz[e] honor to all" (p. 
192). There, the striving for equality is a "yearning for 'aristocratic 
equality"' (p. 192), while America instead has adopted a low-status 
egalitarianism.  
As Whitman notes, the exercise of mercy reinforces status 
differences, as only the superior can grant mercy. More importantly, 
mercy recognizes individual differences, while the lack thereof 
indicates formal equality. As the United States has rejected such status 
and individual differences, Europe has formalized grace and made it 
routine to protect social and formal equality. 
The reinforcement of status differences through pardons explains 
why Americans have consistently opposed pardons, even though they 
were frequently used throughout the eighteenth century, largely to 
manage prisons, and did not begin to decline until the early twentieth 
century with the onset of parole and probation. The use of the pardon 
violated the popular belief in egalitarian treatment, with many fearing 
the process would be abused to benefit the wealthy and well­
connected. 66 
Different degrees of egalitarianism are not the only distinguishing 
factor in explaining American harshness. Whitman points to the 
impact a strong state may have through "the exercise of systematic 
mercy and the tendency toward bureaucratization."67 Contrary to U.S. 
beliefs, a strong, rather than a weak state, may bring about mildness in 
punishment. This may not be as surprising as it first appears. A strong 
66. P. 12. The same ideological argument cannot be levied against immigration 
amnesties. The prime beneficiaries, however, are alleged to be large corporations and other 
employers - the wealthy and politically well-connected. 
67. Whitman is not the first to focus on Europe's bureaucratization as a means to milder 
punishment. "It may be possible that low imprisonment rates in many European nations may 
be a consequence of bureaucratic traditions and corporatist political arrangements that have 
insulated public officials from public demands for punishment during eras of 
disruption . . . . " Rick Ruddell, Social disruption, state priorities, and minority threat, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 7, 21 (2005). 
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state, unchallenged in its legitimacy, may be able to afford mildness.68 
Pardons and amnesties demonstrate this, as they are "a tradition of 
the paternalistic exercise of state sovereignty" (p. 143). 
Strong states may also be more likely to imprison high-status 
offenders, which would explain their more frequent application of 
mercy. In the United States nineteenth-century prisons rarely housed 
high-status inmates, in contrast to their Continental counterparts. This 
fact, together with the lack of a strong ideological belief that high­
status inmates do not "'deserve' punishment" (p. 179), did not allow 
for a two-track treatment of high- and low-status individuals or the 
development of separate forms of punishment. It is unlikely, however, 
that the increasing incarceration of high-status offenders today will 
change their treatment. Egalitarian norms lead to their 
dehumanization prior to incarceration, making any treatment that 
befalls them appear justified. 
Whitman does not project his conclusions too far into the future. 
The increasing weakness of the state, however, may lead to further 
harshness in punishment. As many sociologists have argued, the 
modem state increasingly loses its power as it outsources many of its 
primary functions to private industry.69 This is not a development 
unique to the United States, but may be more pronounced here.70 In 
addition, the nation-state concept has come under attack from the 
outside through globalization and international organizations.71 
68. Weak states may use amnesties to buy favor from the families of inmates, or for 
other political reasons. Their amnesties tend to be restricted to those convicted of criminal 
offenses rather than political prisoners. See, e.g. , John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The 
Great Escapes, N.Y. DMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at Al (discussing meaning and impact of mass 
release of Iraqi prisoners by Saddam Hussein's regime only months before the U.S. attack 
on Iraq). 
69. See, e.g. , Deborah Avant, Think Again: Mercenaries, Foreign Policy (July/Aug. 
2004), at http:!/www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2577&page=O&PHPSESSID 
=f36a201d3fe0844d7e91e41d9c2e8c6b (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (discussing impact of 
private mercenaries on state power). Many Americans may have been surprised to learn that 
during the Iraq war and the occupation even military support functions, including 
interrogations and security for political appointees, have been outsourced to private 
companies. No longer is even the state's most cherished power - war-making - its 
monopoly. Id. 
In the criminal justice arena law-enforcement has been privatized through the use of 
private protection agencies. More discussed, though, has been the privatization of prisons, 
creating a prison complex, which is frequently mentioned together with the military­
industrial complex in its economic importance and political power. See, e.g., Clifford J .  
Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal 
States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004). 
70. The Thatcher government in Great Britain adopted the same philosophy which may 
have led to greater privatization and a weaker state there than on the Continent. See, e.g. , 
Cosmo Graham, Privatization - The United Kingdom Experience, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 
185 (1995). 
71. See generally, Peter J. Spiro, New Sovereigntists, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 12 (Nov.-Dec. 
2000); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations In 
International Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1994); Paul Wapner, Politics 
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Behind Whitman's analysis seem to lurk larger questions about the 
practice of democracy in the United States. He notes that, in the 
United States, punishment practices are determined in election 
campaigns (p. 15). This distinguishes the process from European 
countries where largely civil servants exercise bureaucratic control 
over the punishment process.72 Even though Whitman does not appear 
to allow for this possibility, this distinction may be more determinative 
than the existence of a history of status difference. Bureaucratic 
inertia may explain the European reluctance to adopt harsher penal 
measures despite outside pressures. 
As Whitman points to the "intimate nexus between the politics of 
mass mobilization . . . and the making of harshness in criminal 
punishment," he challenges "any of us who like to think of ourselves 
as committed to the values of democracy" (p. 15). His book succeeds 
in raising a larger question about the value and role of democratic 
decisionmaking. In light of his concern about harshness, the focus 
should be on the impact of the American model of democracy on 
penal laws and enforcement. 
Whitman's book provides a novel and insightful historical account 
of the differences in harshness. It challenges the assumptions of 
modern sociologists, human rights activists, and criminal justice 
scholars. At the same time, though, it raises a host of questions about 
the accuracy of its analysis. Granted that, where does one go from 
here, assuming one is unwilling to accept Whitman's defeatist attitude 
that harshness in American punishment will not change? 
II. DEMOCRACY, EGALITARIANISM, AND PUNISHMENT 
Whitman's account raises larger questions about punishment in a 
democracy. May America's form of democracy be directly tied to a 
harsher penalty regime? Some American commentators have argued 
that Europe's abolition of the death penalty was elite-driven and 
therefore thwarts democratic desires. 73 They view American 
punishment as reflective of the popular will. It is more likely, however, 
that democratic excesses have contributed to our harshness in 
Beyond The State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311 
(1995). 
72. Similar examples from other areas of government abound. See, e.g. , Matthew L. 
Wald, Transportation Board Member Leaves Post With a Warning, N .Y . TIMES, June 20, 
2004, at 27 (warning about loss of expertise on National Transportation Safety Board). 
73. Cf Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the 
European Lead?, 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 134 (2002); Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of 
Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD . L .  POL. & Soc'Y 71,  88 (1993); Carol S. 
Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97, 119·20 (2002) 
(discussing hypothesis that death penalty in United States is a function of populism). 
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punishment as law-and-order politicians have (ab)used crime 
policies.74 Whitman presumably does not disagree, but views harshness 
as resulting from "the consequences of formal equality . . .  as instituted 
in a democratic society" (p. 55). This, however, appears to be an 
overstatement as many ideological proponents of determinate 
sentencing have also championed leniency. Most importantly, the 
claim to formal equality has repeatedly been honored in its breach, 
often on race-based grounds. 
A. The Distortions of Law-and-Order Politics 
The use of crime in political discourse is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the United States that can be traced back to the early 
1960s when Republican politicians appropriated the law-and-order 
discourse. It was not until the 1970s that crime became a regular 
election-campaign feature.75 In the political campaigns of 2000, 2002, 
and 2004, crime decreased in importance.76 The decline of crime as a 
crucial campaign topic may lead to a decline in punitiveness, as 
legislatures can pass less punitive measures without an immediate 
backlash. 
A particularly striking example of political excess may have been 
California's three-strikes law, passed in a state notorious for its 
referenda, the prime example of direct democracy.77 On the other 
hand, California's voters have also displayed particular leniency. In 
2000 they mandated treatment, rather than incarceration, for all non­
violent offenders convicted of drug possession for personal use.78 They 
also legalized marijuana use for medicinal purposes.79 These examples 
74. See, e.g. , KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (detailing impact of law-and-order politicians 
on changes in crime policy); CHANGING ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT: PuBLIC OPINION, 
CRIME & JUSTICE (Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough eds., 2002) (detailing public opinion on 
specific sentencing issues). 
75. Most notorious may be the Bush campaign's use of the image of Willie Horton, a 
convicted rapist and murder who, while on a furlough, killed again, in the 1988 election. 
76. For a discussion of the use of crime in political discourse, see generally Beckett, 
supra note 74; TED GEST, CRIME & PoLmcs: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN 
FOR LAW AND ORDER (2001). 
77. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: 
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001). 
78. Proposition 36, in CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: GENERAL 
ELECTION, Nov. 7, 2000, at 66, (proposing amendments to CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210-.1, 
3063.l and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE DIVISION 10.8), available at 
http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2000g.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005); see also 
Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes' Overblown 
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257 (2002) (reviewing ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 77). 
79. See, e.g. , CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1 1362.5 (West Supp. 2005); see also 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3412, 13-3412.01 (West 2001 & West Supp. 2004). These 
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show that the electorate is able to dispense mildness, at least in some 
situations. 
Detailed opinion polls indicate that the public is less punitive than 
politicians appear to assume. Once confronted with specific offender 
accounts, most individuals would impose lesser sentences than those 
currently mandated.so Some jurors have indicated shock about the 
sentences that were ultimately imposed in the cases on which they sat; 
other juries are known to have nullified convictions because of their 
disagreement with the potential sentence exposure.s1 It is therefore 
untrue to view America's harshness as embodied in its populace, 
though the population may be less lenient than that in Western 
Europe. It is equally likely, however, that America's politicians, either 
out of conviction or political calculation, have used crime and penal 
harshness as wedge issues to reinforce public fears, especially those of 
a race-based nature.s2 
It is not political rhetoric alone that has contributed to the 
harshness of punishment. Our particular form of media-moderated 
politics may have contributed as well, as law-and-order politicians 
have begun to summarize their agendas in soundbites. National 
programming has made victims and off enders household names from 
coast to coast. The memories of these victims continue to live on as 
national legislation that has been named after them.s3 In addition, TV 
shows such as "Cops" have contributed to the view of criminal 
offenders as less than human, as deserving of any degradation that 
would befall them. As some have argued, in common law systems 
generally, "ideas about punitive criminal justice are more readily 
diffused and accepted . . .  through the media and political 
institutions. "84 
To the extent that Europe's political and media landscape become 
more Americanized, similar developments are conceivable. Not unlike 
the reaction to serious crimes in the United States, recent sexually 
pieces of legislation, displaying surprising leniency, show the success of liberal lobbying 
organizations, some of which invested substantial amounts of money in these campaigns. 
80. See, e.g. , JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: 
LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES (2003). 
81. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 678 (1995). 
82. See Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 17 (quoting the Reverend Jesse 
Jackson indicating his perception of crime as disproportionately committed by young black 
men). 
83. See, e.g. , Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing 
Commission 's Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 low A L. REV. 563 
(2002). 
84. Ruddell, supra note 67, at 21. 
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motivated killings of children in Germany have caused an increase in 
sentences for sex offenders. Increasingly, punishment issues have 
become part of German election campaigns, particularly when they 
concern sex offenders, juvenile criminals, and non-citizen offenders -
groups that have also attracted punitive reactions in the United 
States.85 Sex crimes in neighboring countries, such as the Dutroux case 
in Belgium, have also increased fear. That case involved a convicted 
rapist who abducted, raped and killed a number of young girls. For 
years the police were unable to clear the cases, and high-level bungling 
led to suspicions that the police and politicians may have been 
involved in the crimes and their cover-ups.86 The more crime plays a 
role in European political debate, the more Europe's politics situation 
may come to resemble that in the United States. 
So far, elite policymakers in Europe have prevented the 
reinstitution of harsh punishments. Even though substantial numbers 
of Europeans, for example, would welcome the return of the death 
penalty,87 most mainstream political parties have not embraced such 
calls. Quite to the contrary, all Council of Europe member states -
with the exception of Monaco and Russia - have ratified Protocol Six 
of the European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits the 
death penalty except in times of war or public emergency.88 Thirty 
member states have ratified Protocol 13, which abolishes capital 
punishment under all circumstances.89 
85. See, e.g. , Hans-JOrg Albrecht, supra note 24, at 202-03 (2004). 
86. See, e.g. , Dutrow: Gets Life for Child Murders, AUSTRALIAN, June 23, 2004, at 9; see 
also John Lichfield, I Had to Kill Twice a Year, Says Self-Confessed Hunter of Virgins, 
INDEPENDENT, July 8, 2004 (discussing arrest of rapist/killer who had managed to operate in 
the French-Belgium border area for decades without being caught). 
87. See, e.g. , Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice: Europe 's Death-Penalty Elitism, 
The New Republic, July 31, 2000, at 12. Opinion polls taken after violent crimes against 
young children are committed, in particular reflect such tendencies. 
88. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty as amended by 
Protocol No. 11 (Strasbourg 1983), entered into force March 1, 1985, at http://conventions. 
coe.int/treaty/enffreaties/Html/114.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). For a list of signatures 
and ratifications, see http://conventions.coe.intffreaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT =114& 
CM=8&DF=16/04/05&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). To become a member of the 
Council of Europe, states are now required to sign on to Protocol Six. The European Union, 
which requires Council membership before it entertains membership applications, exerted 
substantial pressure on Turkey to relinquish use of the death penalty, and ratify Protocol 6. 
Turkish Embassy, Update on the International Human Rights Instruments which Turkey has 
recently Ratified or Signed, at http://www.turkishembassy.com/II/O/InternationalHuman 
RightsUpdate.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); European Union, The Council, EU Policy on 
the Death Penalty, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union to Mark 
the Entry into Force of Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circumstances, July 14, 2003, 11249/03 
(Presse 204 ), P 83/03. 
89. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances 
(Vilnius 2002), entered into force July 1, 2003, at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/ 
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Even though the desire for punitiveness in the United States and 
Europe may not be as diametrically different as current penal policies 
indicate, the types of discourse diverge dramatically. In the United 
States, arguments pertaining to the inherent dignity or human rights of 
individual offenders have fallen on deaf ears, and the law frequently 
affirms this attitude. In Germany, by contrast, even some particularly 
heinous offenders have been successful in asserting dignity rights, but 
not necessarily in obtaining relief. Any successful claim for prisoners 
or criminal defendants in the United States has been group-specific. 
Felon voting rights, for example, have become a viable political issue 
due to their racial impact rather than any democratic deficit that is 
inherent in disenfranchisement.90 Awareness of sexual abuse in prisons 
was initially focused on abuses perpetrated against women rather than 
men. Because of these strategies, successes have often been piecemeal, 
and large offender groups have not been covered.91 These interest­
group focused campaigns, while sometimes successful, frequently 
obscure larger dignity or rights-based arguments. Interestingly, some 
of the race-based argumentation has been exported to France and 
Germany, where it is aimed at protecting immigrant groups and 
religious or racial minorities. 
B. Sentencing Commissions and the Courts: Protectors Against 
Democratic Excesses? 
Neither governmental bureaucracies nor the courts have been 
effective bulwarks against the march to harsher penalties. States have 
put sentencing commissions in place to provide some insulation for 
sentencing decisions. Their technical expertise and statistical 
projections have stopped much ill-advised and harsh legislation. In 
most states, for example, sentencing commissions are legislatively 
mandated to provide prison-cost projections before new imprisonment 
measures can be enacted.92 Much punitive legislation has been stopped 
Treaties/Html/187.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). For a list of signatures and ratifications, 
see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=187&CM=8&DF=16/ 
04/05&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). 
90. See, e.g. , FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 55. Recent litigation involving claims of 
racial disparity in the criminal justice system, which has led to racially disparate 
disenfranchisement includes Farrakhan v. Washington, 259 F.3d 1 1 16 (9th Cir. 2004), and 
Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), reh'g en bane granted, 377 
F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004). 
91. Among such groups are sex offenders, violent offenders, and, increasingly, alleged 
terrorists. 
92. See, e.g. , NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 482 (2004); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their 
Effects, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 16, 19 (Andrew von Hirsch 
et al. eds., 1987) (describing how Minnesota's Sentencing Commission interpreted statute so 
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once its cost became obvious.93 On the other hand, sentencing 
commissions have proven ineffective when faced with highly charged 
demands for sentence enhancements, especially those involving crimes 
against children.94 
The federal sentencing commission might befall an even crueler 
fate. It seems to have become increasingly emasculated, relied upon 
only when it proposes sentence enhancements but not decreases. Its 
decline in political clout appears traceable to a proposal that would 
have abolished the disparity in sentencing for power-cocaine offenses 
versus crack-cocaine offenses.95 After Congress voted down the 
change - a first since the Commission came into existence - its 
political power declined.96 The Feeney Amendment, passed in April 
2003 as part of the PROTECT Act, without Commission input, has 
proven a further watershed event for the Commission.97 For the first 
time, Congress directly legislated into the guidelines without 
consulting the Commission or asking for its input - a development 
unimaginable in Europe where expert bodies are regularly relied 
upon, as Whitman notes (p. 199-201). The fate of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission has become yet more ambiguous in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Booker, which declared the federal 
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional. Some surgical strikes allowed 
the Court to excise only select statutory provisions and declare the 
remammg guidelines advisory and non-binding.98 How the 
Commission will fare in Congressional attempts to reshape the 
guidelines remains to be seen. However, in light of its weakened 
status, it is not expected to be a major player in federal sentencing 
reform. This contrasts with the state systems where commissions have 
played an active role in changing existing sentencing regimes in the 
that Commission has to take prison resources into "substantial consideration" in developing 
guidelines). 
93. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 719·20 
(2005). 
94. See Ann Wall, Sexual Offenses in Minnesota: Recent Changes to Sentencing and 
Post-Sentencing Provisions, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 79 ( 1997); cf. Michael Tonry, 
Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, 17 CRIME AND JUST. 137, 175-76 (1993) 
(describing political pressure exerted on state sentencing commissions). Sentencing 
commissions generally do not address death-penalty-related questions. 
95. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995). 
96. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 93, at 767-69. 
97. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117  Stat. 650. See Barkow, supra note 93, at 
770. 
98. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  
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wake of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Blakely which held 
Washington's sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.99 
In a democracy, protection of minority groups is often left to the 
judiciary. However, in the last two decades neither federal nor state 
courts have been effective or vocal champions of offender rights. Even 
in earlier decades, when they enhanced procedural rights for criminal 
defendants, they rarely protected them against excessive sentences.100 
In recent years, only some state and federal courts have interpreted 
laws so as to allow for the increased exercise of leniency. 101 Such 
protections usually come in the form of procedural guarantees rather 
than successful federal constitutional challenges prohibiting particular 
sentences.102 After all, federal courts have rejected a narrow 
proportionality principle as inherent in the Eighth Amendment.103 
Because of the general inhospitability of courts to the protection of 
offenders against excessive sanctions, advocates have turned to the 
courts with requests for the protection of specific groups - racial 
minorities or women caught in the criminal justice system. Their 
success has been mixed but has not led to greater review of the 
sanctioning regime or the application of punishment. 
It is unclear what role German courts will play in the future 
protection of select offender groups, especially in the continuing 
debate about sex-offender sentencing. Sanctions imposed on sex 
offenders have increased substantially over the last few years, and 
German states have given their judiciaries newly expanded powers to 
impose non-proportionate sentences for incapacitation purposes.104 A 
recent decision by the German Constitutional Court struck down the 
state statutes which increased the options for and length of 
Sicherungsverwahrung for sex offenders. At the same time, however, a 
majority of the judges allowed the continued detention of all those 
held in Sicherungsverwahrung who should have been released as a 
99. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
100. Darryl K. Brown, Reform of Criminal Procedure in the States: The Warren Court, 
Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411 
(2002) (arguing that the Warren Court's criminal procedure reform helped to usher in a 
highly punitive sanctioning regime). But see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (striking 
down the death sentence for rape of an adult woman as violative of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
101. See, e.g. , People v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
102. See generally, Brown, supra note 100. 
103. P. 57; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 1 1  
(2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to California's three-strikes law for non­
violent property offenders); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that 
mandatory life-without-parole sentence for non-violent drug offense does not to violate the 
Eighth Amendment). 
104. Albrecht, supra note 24, at 202-05. 
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consequence of the decision until the federal parliament could pass 
legislation that would allow for such detention. 105 In addition, the 
Court upheld a retroactive abolition of the ten-year limit on the first­
time imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung to allow the state to detain 
some offenders forever, a previously non-existing option.106 None of 
this legislation was animated by offenders who committed further 
offenses upon release from Sicherungsverwahrung, but rather by the 
possibility of such an occurrence. This development is particularly 
jarring as many commentators had expected the abolition of 
Sicherungsverwahrung rather than its rejuvenation.107 
Only the European Court of Human Rights may stall possible 
European tendencies toward increased harshness. Even though it has 
been criticized for being too far removed from local concerns, 
including crime, its remoteness may make it particularly suited as the 
guardian of mild punishment in Europe. 
III. THE UNEXPLAINED GAP 
Most accounts of the differences between the U.S. and European 
criminal justice systems have focused on the late 1960s and 1970s as 
watershed moments.108 Whitman, however, gives short shrift to a 
period in U.S. history which, comparatively speaking, was in many 
respects less punitive than today. Throughout the twentieth century, 
an indeterminate sentencing regime that matched offender and 
offense governed. In the early 1970s, all mandatory sentences were 
abolished in the federal system.109 Use of the death penalty appeared 
105. BVerfG, 2 BvR 834/02 vom 10.2.2004, Absatz-Nr. (1-210), available at 
http://www .bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20040210_2bvr083402.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2005). The German parliament passed legislation virtually identical to the struck-down state 
statutes within the time limit set by the Constitutional Court. This legislation will be 
constitutional since it does not violate the federal-state competency rules which were the 
basis for the Court's decision. 
106. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2029/01 vom 5.2.2004, Absatz-Nr. (1-202), available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20040205_2bvr202901.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2005); see also Albrecht, supra note 24; Frieder Dtinkel & Dirk van Zyl Smit, Preventive 
Detention of Dangerous Offenders Re-examined: A Comment on Two Decisions of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, 5 GERMAN L.J. 620 (2004), available in two parts at 
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=453 and http://www.germanlawjournal. 
com/article.php?id=454 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). For a general discussion of 
Sicherungsverwahrung, see Demleitner, supra note 24. 
107. See, e.g. , Ji:irg Kinzig, Die Sicherungsverwahrung: bewiihrt oder obsolet?,  30 
ZEITSCHR!Ff FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 99, 99 (1997). 
108. See, e.g. , Thomas Weigend, Fines Reduce Use of Prison Sentences in Germany, in 
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 43 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton 
eds., 1995). 
109. See, e.g. , U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1991). 
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to die a slow death.110 Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s collateral 
sanctions decreased in number and scope. No longer were prison 
inmates automatically divorced; no longer were they prohibited from 
entering into contracts.111 While U.S. and European sentencing 
practices appear to have taken a parallel path during those decades, 
they took widely divergent routes during the last thirty years. 
Whitman writes that, in response to prison riots in the late 1960s 
and attacks on rehabilitation and individualized sentencing on both 
sides of the Atlantic, Europe strengthened its mild tendencies, or as he 
notes so pungently, "Europe moved to the left" (p. 193). The United 
States, however, returned to retributivism, "closely associated both 
with populist justice and with deep-seated Christian sentiment" 
(p. 194), and "to formal equality that reflected a deep . . .  distrust of 
status differentiation" (p. 193). Whitman argues that all countries 
found refuge in "older historical patterns" tied to social status (p. 194) 
with the lack of individualization in sentencing and the absence of 
executive clemency becoming the hallmarks of the late twentieth­
century American criminal justice system. Is this what happened, or 
did other events lead these countries to part ways? Is it not possible 
that Whitman's account may overlook other issues, or overplay his 
emphasis on status?112 Does status really play the dominant role he 
ascribes? And even if it does, what triggered this reversion to past 
practices? 
A. The Role of Race and Immigration in Status Analysis 
Because degradation is the typical response to criminals, as 
Whitman claims, the Continental experience, rather than the 
American one, is unusual. Degradation may be crucial in "affirming 
that some persons stand on a higher rung than others" (p. 198). What 
types of societies may be in particular need of such assurances? They 
may be most important in a country that declares itself classless, where 
virtually everyone considers herself a member of the middle class. 
How does an American assert her status? Is education, wealth, 
income, or some other characteristic crucial? Since status seems such 
110. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond 
Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 ,  
15 (2002); Demleitner, supra note 73, at 135. 
111. See, e.g. , Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions 
on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999). 
1 12. Among the intriguing and so far unexplored potential differences is the impact 
Freudian psychology has had on the development of American criminal law and in particular 
the MODEL PENAL CODE. See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 
2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
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an amorphous concept in the United States, with everyone counting 
herself in the middle, it may be particularly important to determine 
who is at the top and the bottom. 
Many societies have clearly delineated status hierarchies, often 
connected to long-standing traditions and family relationships. 
Countries with a strong tradition of immigration may have difficulty 
developing such concepts. As immigration allows American society to 
remake itself and redefine its status hierarchy, it may be particularly 
important - for newcomers and "natives" - to define a low-status 
group, a group that cannot reinvent itself. It may be that the historical 
reality of immigrant groups moving into the mainstream society and 
adopting the American creed necessitates a permanent underclass. 
For many decades African Americans served this need.1 13 This may 
have changed, however, with the civil rights legislation of the 1960s 
that was designed to lift African Americans out of their low-status 
position. The legal changes at the time gave African Americans the 
opportunity to move out of their position at the bottom of the social 
ladder. As a result, there might have been an ever more urgent need 
to stigmatize another group, perhaps closely tracking but not identical 
with a certain racial group. This non-identity makes the continued 
stigmatization of offenders more easily possible, as racial groups 
rather than offender groups are protected against discrimination. 
During the 1960s, race-based immigration restrictions were 
lifted,11 4  causing a substantial increase in immigration during the 1980s 
and 1990s.115 As American society became again more fluid, it lacked a 
group clearly designed as a scapegoat. At the same time, the growing 
unease about the substantial societal upheaval of the 1960s and early 
1970s might have increased the need for such a scapegoat. With ethnic 
and racial groups no longer an appropriate target, criminals may have 
filled the void. Punitive sentencing strategies exploited their new 
vulnerability, helped by media conglomerates whose ratings depended 
ever more on racy news coverage. 
Are similar developments likely to occur in Europe? Even though 
more stable societies have permanent low-status groups, recent 
immigration, combined with media needs and exploitative political 
1 13. See generally Manning Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion (2d ed. 1991); George 
Paul, A Tribute to John P. Frank: John Frank and the "Law Professors' Brief, " 35 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 241, 246 (2003). Even immigrant groups often arrived with or quickly adopted the belief 
that African Americans constituted the underclass. 
114. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(79 Stat. 911)  883 (abolishing race-based quotas). 
115. See, e.g. , Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural 
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven 
Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 865 (1993). For a discussion of Asian exclusion 
laws, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA Rev. 1 (1998). 
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strategies, may make increasingly strict sentencing policies likely. 
Some of this appears to be occurring already. France, for example, has 
adopted the U.S. approach of heavy-handed prosecution of lower­
level offenses, leading to a twenty-percent rise in the French prison 
population since 2001.116 While verbal attacks on immigrants are 
discouraged in Europe, the creation of a connection between 
immigration and crime has caused parliaments to impose heavier 
sanctions. Europe, however, has a long way to go to reach America's 
punitiveness, since its penalty ranges start from a much lower level. 
Nevertheless, some of the developments in Europe may foreshadow a 
growing punitiveness, although couched in different rhetoric than in 
the United States.117 
Even though Whitman declares not to focus on racism in his 
analysis, he cannot help but discuss race in his account of status. His 
book would have benefited, however, from a deeper reflection of the 
role race, ethnicity, and immigration status play in his overall theory, 
especially in light of the current racial and ethnic makeup of the group 
most affected by America's punitiveness. 
B. Notable Omissions: Crime Rates, Religion, and Racism 
In his Introduction, Whitman notes that he will not address certain 
distinctive aspects of American culture, including patterns of violence, 
its Christian tradition, and racism. Instead, he focuses on "American 
patterns of egalitarian social status and on American patterns of 
resistance to state power" (p. 6; emphasis removed), which he 
ultimately ties to some of the issues he purports to exclude from in­
depth analysis. Whitman's exclusion of these three crucial cultural 
differences from deeper discussion is noteworthy and distinguishes his 
book from other (sociological) analyses on the market. He may go too 
far, however, ultimately avoiding some issues that could undermine his 
theory or at least call it into question. 
First, a number of sophisticated statistical studies have shattered 
the myth that the United States and European countries have 
dramatically different crime rates. A number of European countries 
have higher property crime rates than the United States.118 
116. See Craig S. Smith, Islam in Jail: Europe's Neglect Breeds Angry Radicals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A3. 
1 17. See also Ruddell, supra note 67, at 22 (calling for more research into the connection 
between multiculturalism, diversity, and social control). 
118. See, e.g. , FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE 
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1-20 (1997) (documenting similar property 
crime rates but indicating substantially higher homicide rate in the United States). But see 
Charles H. Logan & John J. Diiulio, Jr., Ten Deadly Myths About Crime and 
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Nevertheless, punishment for such offenses is dramatically harsher in 
the United States. One-fifth of state prison inmates in the United 
States today are property offenders.119 Whether the high incarceration 
rate of property offenders in the United States serves as a deterrent 
remains disputed and has to await further analysis.120 
Violent crime rates also are not much different, 121 with the 
exception of rape and crimes committed with a firearm. The access to 
firearms is much more limited in Western Europe, including Great 
Britain, which decreases the likelihood of some violent offenses.122 
Why rape rates are dramatically higher in the United States remains 
unexplained. 
Even though the crime rates may not explain sentencing 
differences, the perception of crime may. With small exceptions, 
Europeans tend to be less afraid of violent crime than Americans, 
especially in large cities. This may be a function of media accounts. In 
the United States, local crime has been made into national news 
through the media. Even though the crime rate decreased in the last 
decade, many Americans continued to believe throughout the late 
1990s that crime was on the rise.123 Despite the creation of the 
European Union and the lifting of border controls in the Schengen 
countries,124 Europe's nations have retained a national view which 
makes them deem crimes committed in another member state foreign 
events. This lessens the likelihood that legislative strategies will be 
developed in response to a crime committed in another country.125 
Punishment in the U.S., in CRIMINAL JUSTICE? THE LEGAL SYSTEM VERSUS 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 156, 172 (Robert James Bidinotto ed., 1994). 
119. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#inmates (last modified Dec. 28, 2004). 
120. See, e.g. , Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1030 
(2004). 
121. In some cases, the definition of an offense as a property or a violent crime may 
differ. Most U.S. jurisdictions, for example, consider burglary a violent offense. 
122. See, e.g., Anthony Gallia, "Your Weapons, You Will Not Need Them. ": Comment 
on the Supreme Court' Sixty-Year Silence on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 33 AKRON L. 
REV. 131, 153-55 (1999) (discussing gun control laws in a number of countries). 
123. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking Federal Criminal Law: What 's Law Got 
To Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing 
the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM L. REV. 23 (1997). 
124. Fifteen European countries are parties to the Schengen Agreement which 
abolished internal border checks at common borders. See, e.g. , Deutsches Auswartiges Amt, 
The Schengen Agreement and the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, at 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/willkommen/einreisebestimmungen/schengen_html 
(last modified July 2003). 
125. Sentencing changes are more likely when crimes are committed in border regions 
or when those committed in one E.U. member state parallel those in another member state. 
The latter led to increasing restrictions on sex offenders in Germany, when the Dutreux case 
in Belgium, which included the kidnapping, rapes and murder of a number of young girls, 
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Second, "some distinctively fierce American Christian beliefs" (p. 
6) also contribute to the growing divide between Western Europe and 
the United States. While Americans often appear to sneer at an 
increasingly nonreligious Europe, most Europeans do not seem to 
consider the decline of organized religion problematic. Many there 
view America's religious fervor as dangerous in the current political 
climate, and as a threat to democracy and human rights. To what 
extent, however, humanist beliefs may temper criminal punishment 
and the "eye for an eye" philosophy may dominate U.S. thinking 
remain unexplored in this volume. Some organized religion may play a 
more important role than currently admitted in the retention of a 
punitive regime. Its emphasis on individual fallibility rather than 
societal injustices, for example, tends to blame the offender for his 
misdeeds rather than attempt to restructure society. Therefore, any 
full account of America's punitiveness needs to focus not only on 
possible theological underpinnings of the current regime, but also on 
practical support for it. 
Third, even though U.S. racism plays only a minor role in 
Whitman's book, it is palpable in his account of social status. As 
Whitman states correctly, penal harshness is not restricted to racial 
minorities, though they may suffer most from it when one considers 
their disproportionate representation in prison and the large numbers 
of racial minorities with criminal records. The current focus on high­
status offenders, most of whom are white, indicates that penal 
harshness is not restricted to the most disempowered.126 Nevertheless, 
enforcement continues to target the poor and minorities, especially in 
the "War on Drugs," which is responsible for the high rate of African­
American prison inmates.127 
In his comparison between Europe and America, Whitman notes 
that Europe experiences its share of racism, with its prisons 
increasingly filled with non-citizens and racial minorities. 128 Since 
many of Europe's racial minorities are relatively recent additions to 
the country, however, the problem is different from the one 
occurred around the same time as two child rape-murders in Germany. Albrecht, supra note 
24, at 202. 
126. See, e.g. , U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: INCREASED 
PENALTIES UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (Jan. 2003), at 
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/S-Oreport.pdf. 
127. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551 (2003). 
128. Pp. 79-80. See, e.g. , Hans-forg Albrecht, Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and Criminal 
Justice in Germany, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS­
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 31 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997); Pierre Tournier, Nationality, 
Crime, and Criminal Justice in France, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION, supra, at 
523. 
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experienced in the United States. Many of Europe's prison inmates 
are first- or second-generation immigrants who have been 
insufficiently integrated in countries that have often made them feel as 
outsiders. French immigrants hail largely from France's former 
colonies in North Africa; German immigrants, on the other hand, tend 
to consist of former Guestworkers and their families from Italy, 
Greece, Spain, and Turkey, along with more recent immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics who can 
demonstrate German ancestry. While the treatment of some of these 
groups may be compared to the treatment of Mexican and Asian 
immigrants in the United States, they do not share the long history of 
slavery that African Americans in this country have experienced. For 
that reason, racism may take different forms - and different solutions 
- on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Whitman argues that racism is important only insofar as 
Europeans are able to identify with their low-status ancestors while 
Americans are unable to identify with slaves, who were at the bottom 
of society in the past (p. 198). Whether this difference is truly decisive 
remains to be tested. Moreover, it may not hold in a Europe that 
incarcerates non-citizens with whom the native population cannot or 
will not identify. All of these differences between Europe and the 
United States deserve further exploration in a historical and 
comparative manner. Harsh Justice has now set the standard for this 
type of exploration which may lead us to understand how countries 
that seem to have much in common have ever further divergent 
policies. 
Comparative law frequently provides us a mirror for our society; it 
grants us insight not only into foreign legal systems and cultures but 
also into our own. Through comparisons we are frequently able to 
understand ourselves better. Whitman makes this point forcefully 
when he notes that comparative lawyers ' "relative claims" in 
describing foreign systems allow for greater "understanding of human 
legal systems" (p. 17). Comparisons across borders may help us 
understand whether it is really America's history of status, 
egalitarianism and suspicion of state power that accounts for current 
punitive measures, or whether other factors have played a more 
determinative role. Whitman's account appears insufficient to 
determine what went awry in the last three decades - whether in 
Europe or the United States. 
IV. WHAT DOES THE FuTURE HOLD? 
Recent developments may change the trajectories of mildness and 
harshness in sentencing practices between the United States and 
Europe. America's "War on Terrorism" may deflect - or reinforce -
its "War on Crime," while Europe's human rights norms may temper 
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potentially harsh tendencies. Ultimately, fiscal constraints, rather than 
ideology, may change the future of America's "harsh justice." 
A. Terrorism 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, it appeared as if 
the harshness of the criminal justice apparatus would become focused 
on suspected terrorists. While some of this occurred, so far very few 
terrorist prosecutions have taken place. In at least one sentencing, 
even the federal district court judge deemed the sentence she imposed 
under the federal sentencing guidelines too harsh.129 
Shortly after 9/11 it became clear that suspected terrorists would 
not be the only targets of the anti-terror campaign. TV and print ads 
implied that drug users supported terrorism through their habit.130 The 
campaign, however, was disbanded shortly after its start. Instead 
federal law enforcement has focused on the deportation of non-citizen 
offenders, whose criminal, rather than terrorist activity, has been 
portrayed as a threat to national security.131 Terrorism has been used 
as a foil for the prosecution and the deportation of non-citizen 
offenders whose criminal activity has been unrelated to terrorism.132 In 
France and Germany as well, legislation has been tightened to allow 
for the prosecution of suspected terrorists.133 Unlike the United States 
though, it seems to have little effect on other criminal offenders. 
Should further terrorist attacks occur in the United States, 
increasing penal harshness should be expected. This seems to be 
unrelated to concerns of status but driven by fear, a major ingredient 
in crime legislation. While status considerations may lower the 
threshold for penal harshness, fear, a primal urge, may be most 
important. Media and politicians can inform and harness such fears to 
create demands for the harsher treatment of criminal offenders. As 
129. See Kevin Sack, Chasing Terrorists or Fears?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al 
(noting Judge Brinkema's reaction to an eighty-five-year sentence she was forced to hand 
down for a non-violent, terrorism-related offense). 
130. See, e.g. , Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Re-entry for Drug 
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2002). 
131. See, e.g. , Operation Predator, at http://www.ice.gov/graphics/predator/ (last 
modified Mar. 9, 2005); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on 
Terrorism as a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40(6) CRIM. L. 
BULL. 550 (2004). 
132. See generally, Demleitner, supra note 130. 
133. See Eugenia Dumitriu, The EU's Definition of Terrorism: 
The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 5 GERMAN L.J. 
(2004), (discussing EU Framework Decision which aims to unify European law on the 
prosecution of terrorism offenses), at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=434 
and http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=435 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). 
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long as the offenders are perceived as foreign - either because of the 
acts they have committed or because of identifiable differences, such 
as race or religion - it is unlikely that mainstream American society 
will rise to their defense. As Arabs are not recognized officially as a 
different race, much of the debate has focused on the selective 
treatment of Muslims.134 Any potential threat these individuals may 
pose has been used to justify their low-status treatment. Any 
indication of a possible threat gives rise to further fears on the public's 
part, justifying treatment that it would not condone under other 
circumstances. This may explain the public's limited outrage about 
and condemnation of internationally condemned methods used 
against alleged terrorists, including disappearances, targeted 
assassinations, and torture. 
As mere suspects have been treated in this manner, the convicted 
can be subjected to yet further abuse, and any methods used against 
alleged terrorists will ultimately open the door to the further 
dehumanization of all offenders. To what extent the courts can serve 
as an effective bulwark against the tidal wave of fear, dehumanization, 
and abuse remains to be seen. While the threat of abuses exists on 
both sides of the Atlantic, the greater magnitude of fear of a future 
terrorist attack in the United States makes Americans more prone to 
commit abuses. 
B. Human Rights 
Surprisingly, Whitman mentions human rights only in passing in 
his discussion of dominant differences between the United States and 
Europe. Europeans have made their resistance to the death penalty an 
important issue in their relationship with the United States.135 Many 
other harsh penal practices have triggered opposition, though most are 
less well-known in Europe. 
Americans frequently portray their countrys the protector of 
human rights. America's view of human rights, however, remains 
limited by domestic laws. The U.S. Constitution trumps modern 
human rights treaties, and the United States has often refused to sign 
on to regional or international human rights tribunals on 
constitutional grounds. Institutions outside the United States cannot 
134. A religion- rather than race-based focus may be more useful as a law-enforcement 
tool as many of the suspected terrorists are not Arabs. Among them are Jose Padilla, the 
American citizen suspected of attempting to procure a dirty bomb, and Richard Reed, the 
so-called "shoe-bomber." At the same time the vast majority of Muslims are obviously not 
terrorists. 
135. See generally Demleitner, supra note 73. 
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bind U.S. courts, though some have issued stunning rebukes of U.S. 
sentencing practices, especially in connection with the death penalty.136 
European countries, on the other hand, have been forced to 
increasingly subject their practices to control by the European Court 
of Human Rights.137 In addition, Germany's and France's 
Constitutions are substantially more modern and their courts have 
drawn on non-national jurisprudence in evaluating sentencing 
practices. All of this has restricted the actions of European legislators. 
While many Europeans tend to view some U.S. practices in the 
criminal justice arena as worthy of replication, such as zero-tolerance 
policing, increasingly U.S. punishment practices have come under 
attack. This is particularly true in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison 
abuses. When the police vice-president in Frankfurt threatened a 
suspect with torture, Germany's government registered outrage, and 
initially the suspect's trial appeared endangered. This reaction was 
substantially different from that of the U.S. government, which took a 
much longer time to condemn the actions at Abu Ghraib and launch a 
large-scale investigation into abuses of detainees in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Any investigation, however, appears stalled, and further 
abuse allegations have been met with resistance. 
On a less dramatic level, in a 1974 opinion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court declared the denial of voting rights to convicted felons 
constitutional.138 Even though the disenfranchisement of ex-offenders 
has decreased, the denial of the franchise remains widespread for 
prisoners. Only two states - Vermont and Maine - currently allow 
inmate voting. In contrast, in March 2004 the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) declared a British law in violation of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights because it 
denied certain prisoners access to the ballot.139 Increasingly, 
Constitutional courts around the world have found voting rights to be 
such an integral right in a democracy that it cannot be denied to felons 
because of their criminal record or their imprisonment.140 Again, the 
United States may find itself in a minority position. Yet more 
136. See, e.g. , id. ; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT 
AND TORTURE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD'S COURTS (1996); see 
also Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 
31) (noting violation of the Vienna Consular Convention). 
137. The European Court of Justice also functions as a control organ, though with only 
limited impact in the sentencing arena. 
138. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
139. Hirst v. United Kingdom, App. No. 74025/01 ,  38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 825 (2004). 
140. See Sauve v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.); Minister of Home Affairs v. 
NICRO, 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (S. Afr.) (decision of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa). 
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strikingly the ECHR decided the case on election rights grounds while 
current felon disenfranchisement issues are argued on racial grounds 
in the United States. This is indicative of the value felons are accorded 
in these societies. 
America's apparent disregard of human rights constraints appear 
to be connected to the fact it considers human rights a set of laws that 
apply to others. In the United States, some of these laws are grouped 
as civil rights law, largely protecting the rights of racial minorities, 
women, and other groups considered worthy of such protections. Laws 
protecting the accused are considered part of criminal procedure; once 
a guilty verdict has occurred, individuals lose many rights and 
protections. No longer do they appear to be human. 
C. Fiscal Restrictions, Reentry, and Risk Analysis 
Pragmatic considerations may change America's infatuation with 
"harsh justice." While Whitman's account focuses to a large extent on . 
the federal system - an emphasis explained by its symbolic value -
he misses out on recent dramatic developments in the states.141 
Driven by fiscal considerations, numerous states have developed 
strategies to avoid continued increases in their prison population. 142 
They have abolished mandatory minimums, opted for quicker release 
of prison inmates, and have reinstituted parole. This is encouraging 
since when legislatures in the past have been required to make cuts in 
prison spending, they have chosen to reduce or eliminate "amenities" 
such as health care. Congress, on the other hand, continues its drive 
toward harsher sentencing practices.143 
Another means to decrease imprisonment has been risk analysis. 
The Virginia sentencing commission has been on the forefront of 
developing data that would allow judges to select low-level, non­
violent offenders who could be diverted from imprisonment without 
increasing the risk to public safety.144 It has also developed data to 
identify the most dangerous sex offenders.145 For the group with the 
141. See also Richard S. Frase, Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the 
Exceptional Severity of Sentencing in the United States, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L REV. 227 
(2004) (reviewing Harsh Justice). 
142. For a comprehensive overview of the developments in the states, see VERA 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, at http://www.vera.org/section3/ 
section3_1.asp (last modified Mar. 3, 2005). 
143. See, e.g. , Feeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools 
Against the Exploitation of Children Today ("PROTECT") Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21,  
§ 401, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,  28, and 42 
U.S.C.). See also supra note 25. 
144. See, e.g., Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with 
Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 165, 165-66 (2004). 
145. Id. at 166-68. 
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highest recidivism indicator, Virginia's sentencing guidelines allow for 
a substantial increase beyond the upper end of the guidelines.146 Such 
risk-based assessments are not only cost-effective but may provide the 
basis for future sentencing developments. It is conceivable that this 
strategy becomes attractive to European sentencers as well. 
Germany's Sicherungsverwahrung, for example, is already based on 
risk assessment but of a less empirically-grounded type than the one 
.now available in Virginia.147 On the other hand, risk assessment may 
lead to the release of a larger number of low-level offenders into the 
community, allowing for decreasing imprisonment rates in U.S. states. 
Many states have also taken an increasing interest in criminals 
after their release from prison. High recidivism rates and frequent 
parole failures make it costly for states to reincarcerate these 
individuals, often multiple times during their lives. Over one-third of 
all parolees return to prison, making them a substantial portion of the 
prison population. For this reason, many states have participated in 
reentry programs, which are designed to help released inmates 
readjust to society and prevent them from violating their parole and 
committing further offenses. The President and Congress have also 
shown some interest in reentry initiatives,148 which have gathered 
support from all parts of the political spectrum as they draw on both 
liberal and conservative values. 
How successful such initiatives prove will depend on the future 
financial condition of the states and on the influence prison lobbyists 
and the representatives of prison employees have on prison-related 
legislation. After all, decades of prison build-up have created an 
industry that relies, indeed depends on, the continued incarceration of 
hundreds of thousands of its fellow residents. In the end, economic 
pressures and incentives may overwhelm any perceived cultural 
distinctiveness. 
V. CONCLUSION: "JUSTICE" 
Whitman entitled his book "Harsh Justice" (emphasis added). 
While he does not assail the assumption that what the United States 
metes out as punishment is "just," his account raises the question 
whether "Harshness" would not have been a more appropriate title. Is 
the treatment of those labeled criminal offenders really just? 
146. Id. at 166-68. 
147. Albrecht, supra note 24, at 201-02. 
148. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7-html; Jennifer Leavitt, Note, 
Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal 
Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REv. 1281 (2002) (discussing Second Chance legislation). 
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Chillingly, Whitman notes that because of the impact of grace, 
"there was a shade more of a drive toward dignity, and even mildness, 
in punishment in Nazi Germany, at least for ordinary criminals, than 
there is in America today" (p. 203). Does this not mean that there is 
no justice in today's punishment practices? 
